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CHAPTER TWELVE 
Mediating Multiculturally 
Culture and the Ethical Mediator 
- w hether your mediation practice takes you on a 
circuit oflocal postal codes or globe-trotting overseas, it is likely that 
you will find yourself mediating with parties from a different culture. 
In most instances, the questions you confront will be functional and 
practice oriented: How do I manage the process with parties whose 
cultural affiliations lead them to perceive language and behavior so 
differently? How can I help them reach an agreement despite their 
culturally distinct approaches to the issues they face? 
Occasionally, though, the clash of cultures will lead to ethical 
conundrums. Although all ethical problems are challenging because 
they present compelling values in ineluctable tension, cross-cultural 
ethical dilemmas are particularly agonizing because they seem to 
require a choice between deeply felt cultural traditions. Amid cur-
rent heightened sensitivities attending charges of Western cultural 
domination, the act of choosing in this context seems particularly 
fraught. 
Before delving into the specifics of intercultural negotiation, it 
is important first to clarify some fundamental terms and concepts. 
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What do we mean by culture? How does culture affect negotiation? 
And how might intercultural mediation spawn head-scratching ethics 
questions? 
CULTURE AND DISPUTING 
Ask ten people what culture means, and you will likely get eleven 
answers. The term is notoriously difficult to define and takes on dif-
ferent shadings depending on the purposes the definition is intended 
to serve. 
A Current Definition of Culture 
In the late nineteenth century, British social critics spoke of culture 
when they sought to distinguish aristocratic forays into the "high 
arts" from the baser pursuits of the masses. Matthew Arnold, in his 
1869 polemic, Culture and Anarchy, referred to culture as the "best 
which has been thought and known in the world."1 In contrast to 
materialistic or mechanistic concerns, he viewed culture as those 
endeavors that would "help men live in an atmosphere of sweetness 
and light ... where they may use ideas ... freely-nourished and not 
bound by them. "2 
Later definitions dropped the distinction between "high" and 
"low" artistic or intellectual production and sought to expand under-
standings of culture to include the wide variety of ways that people 
create, consume, and transmit meaning in the world. This capacious 
view of culture's dominion gained traction throughout the twentieth 
century and is reflected in the sweeping field of academic study 
termed cultural studies, which encompasses anthropology, sociol-
ogy, linguistics, and semiotics. According to current understandings, 
culture is the "deep-grammar"3 or "mental software"4 that we use 
to communicate with and "decode" others. 
This broad view of culture surfaces in legal definitions as well. The 
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, a 
body devoted to promoting diversity and multiculturalism, defines 
culture as "the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, 
intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or 
social group. It includes not only the arts and letters, but also modes 
of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, 
traditions and beliefs."5 
Clearly culture today encompasses all those habits of action and 
thought that link us to the larger communities around us. Thus, 
culture is not simply what we do; it is the lens through which we see 
the world. It not only primes our choices but shapes how we view the 
choices of others. 
Cultural Aspects of Disputing Style 
Cultural lenses tint virtually every scene we encounter. What if we are 
in a negotiation and a representative from the opposing firm takes off 
his jacket and rolls up his shirt sleeves? Do we think, "Oh, that's nice, 
he feels comfortable being informal with me. We must be getting 
somewhere." Or do we fret, "Hmmm, how disrespectful. He doesn't 
even think enough of me to stay business-like in his attire. I must 
be losing ground here." Hailing from a formal, hierarchically driven 
culture or from one focused less on status and more on function 
will shape our response to such a change in our negotiating partner's 
dress. 
Experts in intercultural negotiation have identified a series of 
cultural features that influence disputing style. These features reflect 
different cultural conceptualizations of identity, language, and struc-
ture. If disputants bring to the mediation table dramatically differing 
expectations of how individuals fit into group hierarchies and com-
municate within and between them, -mediation becomes more of a 
challenge. Often stylistic differences require the mediator to con-
stantly explain, reinterpret, and reframe. In some situations, the 
parties' norms will be so different from both the mediator's and each 
other's that helping forge agreement will prove ethically problematic. 
Here briefly are some poles along which cultures tend to divide:6 
-
• Sense of identity: Individualistic or collectivist? Negotiators in 
individualistic cultures feel less attached to social groups and more 
inclined to focus on personal goals and preferences. 7 They are likely to 
view negotiation solely as a resource-distribution exercise, focusing 
on the end result of who gets how much and when. Negotiators 
in collectivist cultures view themselves as more interdependent and 
bound by a larger web of social relations and obligations. They place 
greater emphasis on the relationship-building aspect of negotiations. 
Decisions to compromise, hold fast, agree, object, or explain are all 
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made with an eye to how decisions will affect goodwill, sympathy, 
and trust between the parties. 
• Rules: Universalist or particularist?8 Universalist cultures (often 
also individualistic) believe rules should be applied consistently. 
Membership in a particular school, profession, family, religious 
institution, or ethnic group is seen as irrelevant to how rules should 
be understood and implemented. If a rule is fair for one group, it 
is fair for all. By contrast, particularists would trade uniformity for 
sensitivity to context. They believe members of in-groups deserve 
special consideration, precisely because of the relationships involved. 
For particularists, every situation is different, and different situations 
call for different rule application. 
• Status and power: Low power distance or high power distance? Low-
power-distance cultures deemphasize status and hierarchy, focusing 
on individual performance and function. These cultures tend to pro-
mote democratic decision making; the distance between individuals 
at the top or the bottom of an organizational hierarchy is not viewed 
as justifying radically differential treatment. In high-power-distance 
cultures, individuals at the low end of the scale" expect and accept that 
power (e.g. wealth, prestige, access to education and other benefits 
that enhance power) [is] distributed unequally."9 In these cultures, 
age, seniority, rank, and title figure prominently in the distribution 
of rewards and burdens. 
• Use of language: Low context or high context? High-context cul-
tures assume that speaker and listener share a common heritage 
or background and that language builds on a set of unspoken but 
acknowledged understandings.10 Speakers in this culture communi-
cate indirectly through implication and suggestion, assuming that 
the message is partially transmitted to the recipient through a shared 
history and context. By contrast, speakers in low-context cultures rely 
on direct, concrete speech to convey meaning. They believe that the 
message embodied in any communication can be found exclusively 
in the detail and logic of the words used. That is why they stress 
clarity and precision. 
• Structure and time: Monochronic or polychronic? Monochronic 
cultures (like the United States, Germany, and Northern Europe) 
view time as a precious resource to be guarded and preserved. In 
these cultures, individuals are comfortable proceeding through tasks 
in linear fashion, finishing one project before taking up another. Effi-
ciency is highly valued and entails advance planning, agenda setting, 
and strict adherence to schedules. Personal needs are adjusted to fit 
existing work timetables.11 Polychronic cultures view time as a more 
flexible resource that should be subordinated to people's changing 
needs. In addition, projects do not necessarily proceed in lockstep 
fashion. Multitasking, juggling, and zigzagging between projects are 
acceptable approaches to managing professional obligations and the 
many intrusions that disrupt them. 
• Attitude toward uncertainty: Low uncertainty avoidance or high 
uncertainty avoidance? Low-uncertainty-avoidant cultures have a 
higher tolerance for ambiguity and risk. This propensity creates space 
for innovation and experimentation. Low-uncertainty-avoidant cul-
tures celebrate new ideas and are open to alternate approaches and 
deviations from the norm. Rules tend to be informally expressed, open 
textured, and subject to variable interpretations. High-uncertainty-
avoidant cultures, on the other hand, view new or ambiguous 
situations with anxiety. These cultures celebrate structure, tradi-
tion, ritual, and formally expressed rules. Comfort is found in "doing 
things the way we've always done them."12 
-
Although it is useful to learn to identify such traits and features 
that may broadly characterize a particular culture, it is also important 
to avoid cultural essentialism-the urge to reduce that culture and 
its members to one monolithic pattern. Cultural characteristics are 
not immutable or universal, and individuals often belong to not 
one national culture but a series of overlapping communities, each 
with its own norms and values. Family units, professional commu-
nities, religious sects, and even tightly knit recreational groups foster 
their own sets of expectations and understandings. An Argentinean 
accountant may engage in behaviors that can be identified with the 
larger Latino culture, but he may also follow a cultural script dictated 
by his family, church, accounting firm, and local soccer league. These 
other behaviors may be consistent or inconsistent with those traits 
we see as "typically South American." 
When analysts speak, for example, of collectivist or high-power 
cultures, they are using shorthand. What they mean to say is that a 
higher percentage of individuals in that culture (as opposed to other 
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cultures) are likely to behave pursuant to collectivist or high-power 
assumptions. Of course, there will be outlier individuals on either 
tail of the bell curve. While generally Mediterranean cultures tend 
to employ a more flexible, expansive view of time and deadlines, no 
one should go into a negotiation with a Spanish or Italian team with 
the expectation that previously agreed-to timetables will have no 
meaning. Better to view the descriptors presented above as cultural 
proclivities that may or may not be actualized in any given setting. 
Keep the information above in mind when mediating multiculturally, 
but do not become rigid or stereotypical in your thinking. 
HOW CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
COMPLICATE MEDIATION 
It doesn't take much imagination to see potential challenges in medi-
ating between two individuals from different cultures. Consider a 
buyer-seller dispute: pair a collectivist, high-context, high-power-
distance, high-uncertainty-avoidant buyer with an individualist, 
low-context, low-power-distance, low-uncertainty-avoidant seller. 
Their dealings may falter on linguistic misunderstandings alone. 
Of course, individuals within a culture do vary, and it is dangerous 
to overgeneralize. Still, if we can indulge in some broad-based 
stereotypes, we may assume that the seller from the individualist 
culture (say, the United States, Germany, or some other Northern 
European or North American region) will be inclined to want to 
begin the encounter by getting down to business. She will not be shy 
in saying what she needs to complete this sale, and she will be aiming 
to memorialize the deal in a detailed document that considers all 
contingencies and explicitly provides for remedies if the buyer fails to 
perform. The buyer (say from China, Japan, or other Asian country), 
working with different conceptions of what a negotiation should look 
like, would likely be more comfortable beginning with small talk, 
perhaps showing the seller the sights about town and breaking bread 
in an informal way before beginning number-crunching in earnest. 
Uncomfortable with blunt self-assertion, the buyer will likely shy 
away from direct requests for a particular price or clear dismissal 
of the seller's demands. Rather, he will talk circuitously about his 
financial budget and other constraints. Also, he will want to frequently 
check back with his associates at the home office to be sure that his 
instincts are in sync with the rest of his department. If the seller is of 
a lower rank in her company than the buyer is in his, that may lead 
the buyer to view her with less respect, whereas the seller may feel 
that such rank differentials are irrelevant. 
Differ~nces in how buyer and seller approach language, relate to 
status differentials, identify as embedded in relational networks, and 
experience time may breed confusion and turmoil. The seller may 
become impatient with the buyer and conclude that his unwillingness 
to say yes or no to particular numbers means he's not really ready to 
deal. The buyer may conclude that the seller is rude and abrupt and 
that her obsession with discussing what will happen in the event 
of a breach means that she is operating in bad faith. The buyer 
may begin with a bias against the seller because her tenure with her 
company is not as lengthy as his and her position as a bargaining 
partner may seem to imply disrespect for his experience. Extensive 
rapport-building chitchat about non-deal-related topics may seem 
vital to the buyer, but wasteful to the seller. 
FOUR STEPS IN DEALING WITH 
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
Hal Abramson, an experienced cross-cultural mediator whose com-
mentary appears later in this chapter, has suggested that mediators 
adopt a four-step approach to cross-cultural negotiations.13 When 
mediators are working with disputants from different cultures, he 
advises they (1) understand their own culture, (2) research the 
other culture, (3) bridge any cultural gap, and, when appropriate, 
( 4) consider withdrawal. Mediators always retain the option of with-
drawing if the parties' preferred outcome violates their own ethical 
sensibilities, and they should take that option seriously in difficult 
cases. 
If the buyer and seller discussed above decided to pursue medi-
ation, a mediator who worked through these steps would likely be 
helpful in surmounting culturally generated confusion and moving 
closer to an agreement. 
Step One: Understand One's Own Culture 
This first task involves self-interrogation. The mediator must first 
evaluate her own cultural expectations and biases. Continuing the 
buyer-seller story, for example, a North American mediator (say, from 
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Vlanhattan) is likely to sympathize with the individualist seller. She 
:oo might see the negotiation purely as a resource distribution exercise 
:hat should be handled with maximal economy and parsimony. She 
night encourage both parties to be clear, direct, and straightforward; 
:o share interests, needs, and bottom-line reservation points. And she 
night find a detailed, precise agreement preferable to a vague, open-
~nded one. But preferences are not requirements. If the mediator 
;crutinizes her own background, she will come to understand that 
o.er negotiating style is heavily culturally determined. She will see 
that predilections for meandering versus strictly cosseted meetings, 
for vague versus meticulous drafting, or for formal versus informal 
manners of speech are equally valid choices, and that it would be 
improper for her to favor one cultural style over another. 
Step Two: Research the Other Culture 
Because in our example the buyer is from Asia, the mediator should 
inquire into Asian practices and gather as much information as 
possible about prevailing cultural norms of the area. In the course 
of doing this, the mediator will learn that the buyer is following 
a well-established cultural script and that the buyer's obliqueness 
and concern for what peers back at the home office say about 
the deal are not necessarily ploys to drive up the price. Rather, 
they reflect the more communal, relationship-oriented values that 
predominate in the buyer's homeland. Once the mediator gains a 
better understanding of the buyer's view of relationships, language, 
negotiating pace, and structure, she can function more effectively as 
interlocutor. 
Step Three: Bridge Any Cultural Gap 
At this point, the mediator can attempt to bridge the cultural divide 
by helping educate each party about the other's culturally driven 
behavior and help them approach one another with a more open 
and accepting mind. The mediator might explain to the impatient 
seller that the buyer is working with a different set of goals for the 
negotiation. She might help the seller see that the buyer's elliptical use 
oflanguage fits into his larger notion ofkeeping relations harmonious. 
She might question the seller's assumption that the buyer doesn't 
really want to settle and explain that team negotiating is common 
in other areas of the world. She might ask the seller whether she 
might be comfortable slowing the discussions down, engaging in 
more purely social activity, and relying on a final document that 
might not be as thorough or detailed as she would ordinarily like. 
The mediator would also approach the buyer and talk to him about 
how he is interpreting the seller's abrupt response to his offers. She 
might explain the more task-oriented approach of North American 
negotiators and see if the buyer might be able to respond to the seller's 
need for clarity and forward movement by streamlining the process. 
Step Four: Consider Withdrawal 
Working with culturally diverse parties, a mediator needs to consider 
whether the end result comports with her own sense of ethics and 
professionalism. In the buyer-seller example, it would not seem that 
the stylistic differences presented by the North American seller and 
Asian buyer call the mediator's professionalism into question. It is 
possible that the parties' cultural differences may have so corroded 
trust and belief that the mediator is unable to repair the damage. 
Misunderstandings may have reached such a pitch that the mediator 
is unable to excavate common ground. But these failures implicate a 
mediator's skill and effectiveness, not her ethics. 
In some multicultural disputes, however, the culture clash leads 
to ethical problems. In some cases, the question is not whether 
the mediator can locate common ground, but whether the ground 
that one or both parties insist on occupying is terrain the mediator 
feels comfortable sharing. What happens when a clash of cultural 
values leads to a potential outcome that the mediator finds ethically 
troublesome? Case 12.1 explores this question. 
CASE 12.1: HANNAH AND YOAV'S 
BROOKLYN DIVORCE 
Hannah and Yoav grew up in an ultra-Orthodox Jewish community in Brooklyn 
where arranged marriages are common. Following this tradition, they wed when 
they both turned eighteen. In the thirteen years since the wedding, Hannah and 
Yoav have followed Jewish law (the Halakhah) assiduously, observing evezy ritual of 
Orthodox Jewish life. 
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As is common in this community, Yoav has not held a steady job throughout 
the marrtage. Most of the time he can be found in shul studying the Torah. He has 
relied on Hannah to be the primary wage earner. In the early years of the marriage, 
Hannah worked as a grade-school teacher, but ten years ago, Y oav gambled away the 
family's savings. To boost her salary, Hannah began working for her father, who owns 
several nursing homes throughout the country. As a highly positioned and well-paid 
member of the family enterprise, Hannah was required to travel extensively and 
was exposed to a more secular world. Over time, she found herself questioning 
many of the practices of her community and found herself attracted to a life less 
circumscribed by religious rules and mores. At the same time, Yoav proved himself 
unwilling to confront and manage his gambling addiction. When Hannah sought help 
from the neighborhood rabbi, he simply told her to pray to God and continue being a 
"good wife." 
Disillusioned with her community and despairing of her marrtage, Hannah asked 
her husband for a divorce. He refused. Jewish law provides that only the husband 
may initiate a divorce. The husband alone is authorized to grant a get, the certificate 
that ends the marriage.14 If a husband withholds his consent, his wife is considered 
still bound to him by Jewish law. She cannot remarry, and any children she might 
bear in a subsequent marriage would be considered ~mzerim iliterally, bastards) 
and heavily stigmatized. A woman whose husband refuses to ,deliver a get is known 
as an agunah, "a chained woman." 
Hannah does not want a huge fight with Yoav and would like to obtain a get 
through mediation, if that is possible. Although she feels alienated from the ultra-
Orthodox community and feels certain she will not return, she does not want to 
stigmatize or taint the prospects of any future children she might have. In addition, 
she appredates her parents' support and does not want to damage them further 
among their peers. Pursuing a secular rather than Jewish divorce would heighten the 
scandal. Y etshe is suffidently offended by Yoav' s recaldtrance and the unhelpfulness 
of the rabbis that a secular divorce remains very much on the table. Hannah has 
consulted an attorney and has learned a bit about how divorces are obtained in New 
York family courts. 
Yoav is furious and afraid. He has never supported himself. He says the only 
way he will grant Hannah a get is if she promises to give him $500,000, which is 
almost the entire amount that Hannah has saved by working with her father and 
scrimping on personal expenses over the past decade. Hannah feels the request is 
extortionate. She worked hard for that money and does not believe Yoav contributed 
anything positive to the marrtage. She is willing to give him some money, but not 
the entire amount. When she learns that a secular court would not award him more 
than $2 50,000, she names that number as her walkaway point. 
In mediation Y oav makes the case that any future children Hannah might have 
will never be able to have a "Jewish life" because of her selfish dedsion to pursue a 
dvil divorce. Hannah is entirely unsure if she will have children, but the argument 
has some force with her. She has authortzed you to offer Yoav $375,000-50 
percent more than he would be entitled to in a New York family court. You believe 
that Y oav will probably take it. 
Do you go forward fadlitating this agreement? 
Before proceeding, it is first necessary to clarify in what sense this 
is a multicultural dispute and consider what ethical issues are raised. 
Jewish Orthodoxy Versus Secular Culture 
We can consider this a multicultural dispute because Y oav is negoti-
ating solely within the confines of Orthodox Jewish culture, whereas 
Hannah has only one foot in that world. Increasingly, she has begun 
to locate her values, expectations, and goals in the secular world. 
Ultra-Orthodox Jewry and secular culture are different in many 
ways. Most important for our purposes, they differ regarding gender 
roles and equality between the sexes. Obviously these differences 
figure prominently in Hannah andY oav' s notion of what constitutes 
a fair and correct division of property in the wake of divorce. 
According to ultra-Orthodox tenets, men and women possess 
different intellectual, emotional, and spiritual capacities that incline 
them toward different life tasks. Women are thought to be particularly 
well suited to domestic activities, whereas men are thought to be 
naturally predisposed toward spiritual pursuits. Education in those 
Jewish communities is sex segregated, designed to prepare women to 
raise children within the faith and keep a kosher home, while men 
are trained for a life of Torah study.15 
A primarily patriarchal ordering of rights and responsibilities finds 
expression in the Halachic rules governing marriage and divorce. In 
granting husbands unilateral control over divorce, Jewish law gives 
men an invaluable bargaining chip and an almost insurmountable 
advantage at the negotiating table.16 Secular liberal democracies are 
founded on different assumptions that grant men and women equal 
status (at least theoretically) in the public as well as private sphere. 
The culture clash here relates both to power distance and gender 
roles. Ultra-Orthodox Jewish culture can be viewed, at least in the 
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matter of divorce, as a high-power-distance culture in which both 
women and men accept that power is distributed unequally by 
gender. The culture of most secular liberal democracies adopts a 
lower-power-distance approach to marriage and divorce in insisting 
that men and women enjoy equal power to enter into and dissolve 
their marriages. 
SeH-Identification with Different Cultures 
Y oav is immersed in and accepts the cultural values of his Orthodox 
Jewish community, including the male prerogative to exercise and 
exploit the unilateral power to divorce. Hannah has rejected these 
cultural values and has adopted a lower-power-distance approach. 
Her cultural alignment is with the larger secular community 
where her professional interactions occur. 
The ethical issue for the mediator arises because Hannah is 
considering entering into a settlement that affords her a smaller 
percentage of the marital pie than would a secular court. Yoav is 
using the power conferred on him by Orthodox Jewish law and 
tradition to extract a more favorable postdivorce settlement than 
would be his due were the case decided by a New York judge. Is this 
use of Orthodox patriarchy in the mediation problematic? Is Hannah 
being disadvantaged in a way that the mediator should not condone? 
Is the outcome here one that the mediator should repudiate by 
speaking out against it or terminating the mediation? 
Validating Hannah's Choice 
Although reasonable people could differ on this point, a strong argu-
ment can be made that the mediator should feel ethically comfortable 
helping Y oav and Hannah settle, even if Y oav is walking away with 
75 percent of the marital assets. 
Why is this? First, it is important to remember that one of the 
primary advantages of mediation is that disputants can conclude 
their disputes according to their own values, norms, and preferences 
and not anyone else's. So if a disputant chooses to give more or 
accept less than a judge, legislator, arbitrator, or anyone else might 
deem prudent, that is her right and privilege. Of course, if the 
agreement is too one-sided, a mediator may, and should, worry 
about whether fear, despair, or ignorance is driving the willingness 
to settle for what others would see as a bad deal. And when dealing 
with cultural differences, it is important to consider whether cultural 
norms so disable one party as to render negotiations dangerous. In 
that situation, a mediator may want to think about withdrawing 
or recommending that the disempowered party seek assistance or 
information from a support person. 
As we have seen, cultural norms support some behaviors and 
demonize others. In addition, as in Yoav and Hannah's case, they 
offer substantive bargaining chips to some individuals and withhold 
them from others. In light of the advantages that cultural norms can 
confer, mediators are well advised to consider whether the bargaining 
table is too tipped in one party's favor to yield an ethically acceptable 
outcome. 
Here, for a variety of reasons, the mediator may view Hannah's 
choice as sufficiently free and self-determining that the mediator 
should feel comfortable proceeding. First, Hannah does not feel 
confined by the ultra-Orthodox rules governing divorce. She has 
already made a choice to step out of that community and live her 
life according to a different set of standards. For this reason, she 
enjoys a certain liberty of choice. She can choose to bargain with 
Yoav regarding his consent to the Jewish divorce, or she can pursue a 
secular divorce in the New York courts. She has a variety of options, 
and each is real and viable. 
Pursuing a Jewish divorce holds certain advantages for her; it will 
remove the possibility of exclusion and stigma for any future children 
she may have and spare her parents unnecessary embarrassment. But 
Y oav' s consent will cost her an additional $125,000. Hannah appears 
to be a strong, capable, well-informed negotiator. She understands 
the entitlements that secular law would confer and understands the 
costs of pursuing them. She is well positioned to determine whether 
the personal advantages that obtaining a Jewish divorce confers are 
worth the additional money she will need to pay. If she chooses 
to pay it, she will still be financially stable and can look forward to 
rebuilding her nest egg using her existing skill set. 
Finding Balance 
Taken too far, the notion that "parties should be able to do what they 
want in mediation" has the potential to yield monstrously unfair 
outcomes. Although we should be wary of imposing our cultural 
norms on others, most of us would draw a line at outcomes that seem 
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(to our admittedly Western, democratic eyes) abusive or exploitative. 
Whereas a purely relativistic stance renounces universal standards 
of right and wrong, a less extreme view maintains that it is possible 
to embrace and reject cultural practices pursuant to a consistently 
applied set of standards and principles. 
In sum, mediating multicultural disputes forces mediators to con-
front the twin dangers of cultural imperialism and cultural relativism. 
Taken too far, either stance can cause harm. Refusing to work with 
disputants because of their culturally determined norms commu-
nicates that those norms, and the culture that produced them, are 
inferior. This message undercuts the values of tolerance and inclu-
sion to which the dispute resolution field aspires. On the other hand, 
viewing any cultural practice as permissible simply because it has 
gained acceptance in some part of the world may place vulnerable 
disputants in jeopardy and violate individual mediators' cherished 
moral commitments. 
It is important to find some balance between a cultural provin-
cialism that finds fault in difference and a radical relativism that 
insulates from ethical judgment all culturally driven practices. In 
Y oav and Hannah's case, the liberty Hannah enjoys to choose between 
cultural norms and evaluate the benefits she can derive from each 
makes the mediator's balancing act easier. The mediator can affirm 
Hannah's financial sacrifice without worrying that she has fallen into 
a trap set for her by a culture unsympathetic to female autonomy 
and agency. But what if, due to the disputants' cultural affiliations, 
the choices are more constraining? 
In the next case, starker options make finding the balance more 
difficult. 
CASE 12.2: ZIBA AND AHMED'S 
IRANIAN-AMERICAN DIVORCE 
Seventeen-year-old Ziba and her forty-four-year-old husband Ahmed have come to 
you for mediation services. Ziba and Ahmed have been married for four years. They 
have two sons, ages three and two. Ziba wants a divorce, but, like her husband is 
anxious to remain part of the local mosque and surrounding community. In order to 
ensure that the divorce is handled in accord with Quranic prindples and meets the 
approval of their peers and community elders, Ziba and Ahmed met with their imam 
to learn how their marriage contract may be properly resolved in accord with local 
interpretations oflslamic law. 
Their imam advised them that while a husband can ask for and obtain a divorce 
for any reason, he is obliged to support his children until they reach the age 
of majority, regardless of who has primary custody. If the wife remains in the 
husband's home to observe a mandatory waiting period of seclusion, then he must 
provide for her needs during that time. In addition he is obliged to pay the amount 
stipulated in the marriage contract that must be paid if the marriage comes to an 
end. Ziba and Ahmed's marriage contract calls for a payment of forty thousand 
dollars. 
The imam also tells Ziba that she cannot receive a divorce without Ahmed's 
consent. And if she initiates the divorce, she will lose her right to the marriage 
contract payment, although Ahmed's finandal obligations toward the children still 
stand. As far as custody of the children goes, local understandings of Islamic law 
presume that young children should stay with their mother, but that once sons reach 
their seventh birthday, custody reverts to the father. 17 
Ziba is miserable in the marriage. Ahmed is controlling and rigid in his notions of 
what Ziba can do. He monitors her movements, allowing her outside only to shop 
for groceries and run errands for the house. In addition. he has taken a second wife 
(in accord with his privileges pursuant to Islamic law) and has begun to pay less and 
less attention to both Ziba and their children. 
Angry and humiliated, Ziba insists she must have permission for the divorce 
from her husband and without it cannot move on with her life. Ahmed says that he 
will not grant her request unless she forfeits her marriage dissolution payment and 
any other financtal support for herself and agrees to give up custody of each child at 
age five. Ahmed says that by asking for a divorce, Ziba is demonstrating that she is 
an unfit mother and that his sons should thus revert to his care at the earlier age. 
Ahmed says that it is fitting that his sons should be taken into his care and raised by 
his female relatives. 
At the mediation, Ziba capitulates and tearfully says she will waive all rights 
to finandal support and agree to his requests regarding the transfer of custody at 
the given ages so long as Ahmed grants her request for a divorce. Although Ziba 
has agreed to relinquish her children two years earlier than traditional Islamic 
law would warrant, privately negotiated deviations from default rules are not 
uncommon. Ahmed is very unhappy with the prospect of divorce and strongly 
feels Ziba's behavior compromises her ability to parent. He has stated to you in 
private that the only reason he is not demanding inlmediate transfer is that he 
doesn't think Ziba will agree and doesn't believe he would receive support from 
his community. He is confident, however, that the agreement as contemplated is 
broadly supportable and within the norms of the Iranian community in which 
they live. 
As mediator, do you help the parties with their divorce? 
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Comments on Case 12.2 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow 
Whose culture? Whose laws? Whose ethics? Yours or mine? 
Ziba and Ahmed's divorce mediation raises very difficult issues 
of cross-cultural mediation. My response to the dilemma presented 
here is easy for me, but likely to be seen as very controversial and 
unacceptable by many other mediators. I will explain why. 
Self-determination (by both the parties and the mediator), capacity 
and consent to any agreements, "true" understanding of possible 
alternatives, and my own legal and social justice concerns all militate 
against my deferring to the parties' claimed desire to use religious 
law and principles to resolve their dispute. 
SUITABILITY FOR MEDIATION? CLASH BETWEEN RELIGIOUS/COMMUNI-
TARIAN AND LEGAL SYSTEMS. Many ethnic, religious, and other 
affiliated communities have their own systems of rules, laws, and 
customs that they may seek to "enforce" through private mediation. 
Some have argued that mediation is particularly appropriate in such 
settings where communities seek to enhance their shared community 
values by their own systems of dispute resolution, away from the 
state or other cultures that they do not recognize or that do not 
recognize them (Freshman, 1997). IfZiba and Ahmed had contacted 
me with their desire to use Shari'a law, I would likely have made a 
referral to a specialized religion-based mediation center. I would not 
take their case. Here's why: 
First, Ziba, now seventeen, has, according to the facts, been married 
for four years. That means she was thirteen when she married. The 
facts as given do not specify whether her marriage took place in the 
United States or in another country, but by no measure of "full 
faith and credit" would I regard a marriage made at thirteen to be 
a legal marriage in the United States. And wherever they live in the 
United States, a state court will have to finalize their "legal" divorce. 
Most states require evidence of a marriage certificate to certify 
the marriage when the divorce is judicially approved. A marriage 
certificate of a girl of thirteen would not be valid in virtually all 
states of the United States. Thus, in my view, the marriage is not 
"legal" under American domestic law (and American law is still 
required to make the divorce legally binding here) and legally could 
be annulled. In addition, it is also possible that, given the absence of 
a legal marriage, Ahmed might even be guilty of statutory rape under 
American law. Ziba could possibly file charges against him if she 
wanted to (or she might choose to use this information to prevent 
him from further abusing her or to "bargain" for her "rightful" 
financial and custody rights). 
As a lawyer mediator with some experience in domestic relations 
(in litigation and in mediation), I would tell Ziba and Ahmed this 
together in a joint premediation session, as well as in any separate 
caucus that I would have with both parties. I would give legal advice 
and counsel to both of them at the same time and tell them what 
American law provides. I would, in the presence of both parties, 
tell Ziba that if she consulted an American lawyer, she would likely 
be entitled to financial support, as well as custody of both of her 
children. Other mediators might fear doing this because of possible 
domestic abuse or other negative actions that Ahmed might take 
when he sees his wife being so advised, but in my view, as long as she 
is living in the United States, she has the right to legal information 
according to the rules of this country. 
WHOSE SELF-DETERMINATION? While I fully acknowledge all of our 
profession's norms and platitudes about self-determination (Stan-
dard I, Self-Determination, Model Standards of Conduct for Medi-
ators, 2005), I do not believe that a thirteen-year-old girl had the 
capacity to "self-determine" when she married Ahmed, and thus 
the whole premise of the termination of the marriage is in question 
(for me). In addition, as long as we are looking at the platitudinous 
standards (which seldom help resolve really difficult questions), I 
would decline this case also for several other reasons: 
• I am obviously not "impartial." I am judging the validity of the 
marriage and giving advice to one of the parties that at least one, 
if not both, of them is likely to view as "partial" (Standard II, 
Impartiality, Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators). 
• I do not have the "competence" to mediate a case involving 
Shari' a law since I know not much about it, except as a legal 
educator and scholar.18 I do know that its teachings are actu-
ally subject to much controversy, change, and interpretation, 
and I do not entirely trust what the parties tell me their mullah 
has told them (Abu-Odeh, 2006; Model Standards of Conduct 
for Mediators, Standard IV, Competence). 
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• I do not believe that a mediation that would sanction or permit 
these results would be one with the requisite "quality of pro-
cess" (Standard VI, Quality of the Process, Model Standards of 
Conduct for Mediators), which, in my view, requires "safety" 
of the parties (including the affected children), full presence and 
participation of the parties, party competency (including non-
interference by third parties), and "mutual respect" among all 
participants. 
• I have a conflict of interest (Standard III, Conflicts of Interest, 
Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators) because I have 
spent a great deal of my legal career as a feminist advocate 
for equality in marriage, self-determination, and the rights of 
women to no-fault divorce, as well as to adequate child and 
spousal support, and thus could not possibly be seen as neutral 
or impartial by Ahmed (and maybe by Ziba as well). In addition, 
I am committed in print (Menkel-Meadow, 2001), as well as 
in my practice, to tolerance and appreciation of diversity, in 
culture and religion, but I am a secular humanist, who, while 
acknowledging the importance of plural systems o{Iaw and 
culture, could not myself "preside" over a mediation that used a 
set of norms and customs that institutionalizes deep structures 
of inequality, even if seemingly "consented to." 
I have turned down other cases in which parties are subject to 
deeply unfair or unequal rules or bargaining endowments (some 
cases of employment settings, some cases of unequal legal represen-
tation) or other matters where, in my view, mediation would lead to 
outcomes for which I would not want to be ethically responsible 
(Menkel-Meadow, 2004). 
More complex issues actually underlie these "easy" answers from 
the Model Standards. One is that, as the hypothetical is intended 
to reveal, mediations like this pit significant cultural differences 
against each other: the couple's desire to use Shari' a law, which does 
not grant Ziba the same rights as domestic laws would, versus the 
mediator's own sense of legal entitlements and "justice." In cases 
of radically different cultural understandings, whose cultural under-
standings should govern? Isabelle Gunning has written eloquently 
on this point, in several relevant contexts, first in how "Western" 
feminists should deal with the religious or ethnic practice of "female 
genital mutilation" in the face of"international" standards of human 
health and safety (Gunning, 1991-1992, 1995) and, second, in seeing 
mediation as a site for self-empowerment for groups that are not 
recognized by or likely to be disadvantaged in formal court proceed-
ings. The problem of cultural relativism or cultural hegemony is very 
significant in many modern mediations where parties choose to avoid 
formal law and legal systems and elect to apply other sources of social 
norms that they (and their mediators) may or may not share. There 
are no easy answers to the question of"whose culture" should govern. 
PROCEED ON A BASIS OF DECLARED "SELF-DETERMINATION"? I suspect 
that many mediators would proceed with the mediation on the 
theory of party "self-determination," as long as they were comfortable 
with the conclusion that Ziba has "chosen" to be bound by Shari'a 
law. For these mediators, the cultural decision is for the parties, and 
as long as the parties "agree" on what cultural norms they want to 
apply to their dispute, the mediator's role is simply to ensure the 
process is fair and the agreement is freely consented to. In this case, 
some mediators might ask who am I to judge what these parties want; 
in the interest of self-determination, they have chosen to be governed 
by their own religious norms. 
I could not, given my own "ethical culture" (Menkel-Meadow, 
2001), act or be "complicit" in an agreement that I felt was legally, 
morally, or ethically wrong (and under these facts, I think all are 
true for me). Ziba did not knowingly consent to her marriage; she 
is dominated by Ahmed in the marriage and wants out so badly she is 
willing to bargain away her own maternity in order to be free of him. 
Mediators have cultural and ethical commitments too, and in 
my view, no mediator (and certainly not this mediator) should 
participate in a mediation that she thinks will lead to a morally, 
legally, or ethically "unconscionable" result. What is unconscionable 
is, of course, subjective, personal, and non universal. Thus, mediators 
must disclose their own relevant cultural, legal, personal, ethical, 
religious, political, or other commitments that will clearly affect how 
they facilitate dispute resolution. 
One shorthand way to think about this is that the standards are 
for mediators too-and that includes self-determination. Mediators 
must also have the ability to determine when their "self' (including 
identity, integrity, professionalism, or other commitments) cannot 
be realized in a particular mediation. 
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WHAT IF THE PARTIES DO NOT REALLY SHARE A CULTURAL 
UNDERSTANDING? As difficult as the above "cultural" issue is, there 
is even more difficulty if the parties themselves do not share cultural 
understandings or agreements about what norms to apply. Although 
not at issue as the hypothetical case is framed, suppose that early 
on or during the course of the mediation, it becomes dear that 
Ziba has actually been "coerced" into accepting Shari'a principles 
and, once informed of her rights under American domestic law, 
she would prefer to have those legal norms applied to her case. 
How mediators should "mediate" cultural differences between the 
parties in mediation is enormously complex. The norms by which 
mediation agreements are to be reached are often themselves the 
subject of negotiations and mediations, and mediators need to be 
able to mediate which norms will govern the mediation, even across 
cultural differences. Sometimes parties can agree , on outcomes 
without explicitly acknowledging what principles got them there, but 
in general, where there is not some agreement about the governing 
norms or principles, the agreement may be in trouble if it requires 
enforcement, justification to third parties, or acceptability and 
legitimacy for the parties. 
In this case, Shari' a law and American equitable distribution, 
community property, and no-fault divorce principles dearly conflict 
with each other, and if the parties cannot agree on what norms to 
apply to their divorce, mediation may not be the appropriate forum. 
In my view, a culturally competent mediator must at least raise with 
the parties what their differences are, what are the sources, cultural, 
religious, legal, or personal, of their differences, and offer sensitive 
conversations about how those differences might be handled. Of 
course, "cultural differences," like all other issues in mediation, may 
in fact differ in the eyes of the beholders, and different perceptions 
about whether there are in fact "cultural differences" may lead to an 
even deeper level of analysis, and disagreement (Gadlin, 1995). 
THE RELEVANCE OF LAW. The astute reader of this commentary would 
have noticed that I have used legal analysis to locate my own cultural 
differences with the parties. "Under domestic/state/American law," 
Ziba would be entitled to no-fault divorce, possibly both child and 
spousal support, and certainly a legal right to pursue custody of her 
children. Thus, this mediator is using law to center (at least part 
of) her judgments about the case (and "judgments" they are). As 
I have controversially stated in other venues, mediation is often 
(and in this case would be) "the practice of law" (Menkel-Meadow, 
1996). Even if the parties chose to be governed by Shari'a law, in the 
United States, a legal divorce must be approved by a state court, and 
thus American law is implicated in the decision. While it is now a 
controversy in many legal systems, including the United Kingdom, 
the United States, and Canada, about whether formal state courts 
should recognize Shari'a law in family law determinations, in the 
United States, Shari'a law has not yet been recognized in formal court 
determinations. 
Every year in the United States, thousands (maybe even millions) of 
couples use private mediation, often with nonlawyer mediators who 
may be unfamiliar with applicable legal principles, using whatever 
principles they can agree on, to resolve issues of separation, financial 
support, child custody, and property division. In many, if not most, 
cases, if there is a settlement or private agreement, courts will approve 
the divorce in a general, pro forma (but legal) way and will not usually 
inquire into the equities of the parties' agreement unless an issue is 
raised formally with the court. There is no regular court review of 
private divorce agreements, even when the court must sign a formal 
decree of legal divorce. Nevertheless, family relations and status are 
still a matter of state law in the United States (indeed a very contested 
question of law, as the same-sex marriage political and legal battles 
make clear), and for me, in this case, as in all others I mediate, "the law 
is relevant, if not determinative" (Friedman & Himmelstein, 2008). 
Thus, I will not mediate a case where there is relevant law for the 
parties to consider in evaluating their possible outcomes, rights, and 
alternatives, and the parties are unaware of those legal entitlements 
or endowments. 
I would ask the parties here if they have discussed their legal rights 
with counsel, and if they have not, I would ask them if they would 
like referrals to do so. In this case, if Ziba and Ahmed said they were 
not interested in American law, I would tell them anyway (advising 
them together in joint session and then asking if they wanted to meet 
with me individually to discuss further). 
For many mediators, this would be overstepping the boundaries 
of the mediator's "neutral" role, would involve the mediator in legal 
information provision or more accurately, legal advice giving, and 
would likely lead to the perception that the mediator was "partial" to 
one side (advising Ziba of what she could gain by pursuing American 
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secular law). Yet for me, this legal advice and information would be 
absolutely essential for any determination I might want to make about 
whether the parties could in fact consent knowingly and willingly to 
an agreement under Shari' a law that eschewed legal entitlements that 
the parties might otherwise have. 
Mediation is a process, not a separate justice system that automat-
ically dismisses or renders inapposite "the law." At the same time, if 
a party is fully knowledgeable about the legal entitlements or argu-
ments the law may provide, that party (indeed, both parties) may well 
decide to reach agreement or settle on the basis of other values (or 
nonlegal principles), seeking to apply his or her own sense of justice 
or fairness within his or her own relationship or community. Law or 
legal principles are not always determinative, and parties may and 
often do seek to do "real," if not "legal," justice between themselves. 
If, as a mediator, I am convinced they fully understand what they 
are doing, the parties may agree to depart from what the law might 
grant them. Laws are passed by legislatures for "the general public" 
and are interpreted by judges in particular situations. Mediation 
offers the parties a more democratic, nuanced, individualized, and 
self-empowering opportunity to interpret the law for themselves, as 
long as they agree and as long as the agreement is not legally voidable 
(by being unlawful). 
However, as a lawyer mediator I will not participate in or "preside" 
over an agreement that is "unlawful" under applicable law. In this 
case, the secular law of divorce is still necessary to grant the parties a 
legal divorce in a state court of appropriate jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION. In this case, beyond the question of "whose culture" 
and "whose law" is the (for me) ethical question of"whose justice." 
Mediation is a process; it has no substantive commitments except 
knowing consent of the parties (and is backed up by the legal system's 
enforcement of legally acceptable contracts that can be enforced in 
courts) and an aspiration to do individualized and legitimate justice 
for the parties as they see it. For me, however, a mediator is also a party 
to a mediation, and thus the agreement that is reached must also be 
one that I can be accountable and responsible for as a participant in 
the process. My sense of ethics, culture, and yes, even justice is also at 
stake, for I am a party too. 
I would honestly and completely tell the parties everything I have 
just told you, the reader, and would (1) advise them to seek legal 
advice and counsel about what is necessary for a legal divorce in 
my community; and (2) withdraw and ask them to find another 
mediator if they insist on applying a set of norms I am not competent 
to enforce, even as I have views about whether they do justice or not. 
This, of course, raises the next difficult issue of whether I am at all 
responsible for an outcome reached by someone other than myself 
(another mediator who agrees to let the parties use the agreement 
they have framed in the hypothetical, which you can see I think is 
unfair and unjust to Ziba). But that is a question for another day. 
Comments on Case 12.2 
Harold Abramson 
The challenge posed by Ziba and Ahmed's divorce differs from diffi-
culties customarily encountered in cross-cultural disputes.19 Often in 
domestic or international mediations, a cultural gap exists between 
the parties. But here the parties are culturally aligned, and the gap 
lies between the mediator and the parties. 
The goal, as I see it, is clear: to ethically bridge the gap between the 
mediator and the parties while avoiding culturally imperialist behav-
ior. No mediator wants to be charged with cultural imperialism when 
mediating private international disputes. And yet mediators run this 
risk whenever they resist doing what the parties want done. The chal-
lenge is to «give the parties what they want" without doing violence 
to universally held norms or one's own deeply held personal values. 
For myself, after much soul searching, I decided that were I the 
mediator, I would go forward and assist Ziba and Ahmed in their 
efforts to conclude their divorce. But I reached that determination 
only after rejecting all the alternatives. Ziba and Ahmed don't afford 
a Western mediator any easy answers. All roads point toward moral 
discomfort. As difficult as this was, I tried to put my own personal 
values aside and look instead to see whether working with this couple 
would violate universally accepted international principles of human 
rights. My inquiries suggest that the answer is no; norms surrounding 
gender equity diverge dramatically throughout the world. This is one 
of the disturbing facts of multiculturalism, and as a mediator, I am 
wary of using my own personal views as the yardstick for how the 
parties should structure their affairs. 
A second consideration influencing my decision flows from exam-
ining Ziba's other options. They didn't look promising to me. I 
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thought by continuing to work with the couple, I could help them 
get the best deal possible. Contrary to the usual sunny rhetoric of 
win-win, here I would aspire toward "the least bad" outcome-an 
outcome that involves the least amount of moral violence and 
coercion for all involved. Here is how I got there. 
THE CHALLENGE FOR THE MEDIATOR: A CROSS-CULTURAL DISPUTE. 
The thorny aspect of this cross-cultural conflict can be presented 
succinctly. Both parties agree broadly to a rule that, when they 
apply it, results in a mediated agreement that is unfair according to 
the mediator's Westernized values and may even violate Western 
domestic law. 
Consider the way Ahmed's power over granting a divorce was being 
used to extort a one-sided agreement, at least from a Westernized 
point of view. A Western mediator would likely view as unfair an 
agreement where unemployed Ziba waives needed financial support 
and relinquishes rights to her children once they turn five. Under 
Westernized common law and statutory laws, such a one-sided 
agreement also is likely to be invalid and unenforceable due to 
Ahmed's extortionate behavior and the duress suffered by Ziba who 
wants the divorce. 20 
This culturally shaped family mediation starkly raises an old 
issue in new packaging: Should a mediator withdraw when the 
mediator encounters a rule, practice, or emerging agreement that 
the mediator thinks is unfair? In this dispute, the new packaging 
entails an objectionable foreign cultural rule and its impact on the 
resulting mediated agreement. Without this cultural overlay shaping 
the parties' behavior and resulting agreement, I suspect that many 
Western mediators would withdraw from the mediation. With the 
cultural overlay, however, it is less clear what a mediator ought to do. 
A FOUR-STEP APPROACH. Cross-cultural mediators live under the 
constant threat ofbeing charged with cultural imperialism. Mediators 
do not want to be guilty of parochial ignorance and arrogance when 
objecting to what might be a cultural practice. They want to avoid 
claiming that they are right and the parties wrong. In order to reduce 
this risk, cross-cultural mediators should approach mediations with 
a healthy respect for cultural pluralism and a clear understanding of 
the other cultural practice. 
In analyzing what a mediator might do in this case, I will follow 
the four-step approach that the editor of this book introduced on 
my behalf at the outset of the chapter. This sequence is designed to 
guide mediators along an ethical path that can also help to avoid the 
cultural imperialist charge. The mediator should: 
1. Understand his or her own cultural practices 
2. Research the other cultural practice to be sure that the mediator 
understands its terms and its rationale 
3. Bridge any cultural gap between the mediator and parties by 
posing questions to the parties to be sure that the parties are 
making informed, voluntary, and uncoerced decisions 
4. Withdraw if the mediator concludes that the practice violates an 
internationally recognized norm or compromises the mediator's 
impartiality or the mediation process 
Understand One's Own Culture. Consciously or not, mediators ines-
capably read a dispute through their own culturally shaped lens. 
Consequently, they need to develop a degree of cultural competency 
and self-awareness in order to distinguish universal behavior from 
their own cultural views. Developing this self-awareness requires 
doing some research. I have found it helpful to read articles and books 
that compare communication in different cultures and describe U.S. 
culture for foreigners; it is especially fascinating to learn how others 
view one's own culture. For mediator ethics in the United States, 
the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators provide the primary 
cultural lens through which mediators see their disputes. So I began 
this journey by reacquainting myself with the Model Standards and 
especially the values that they reflect. 
As discussed in Chapter Five in this book, the Model Standards 
do not hold mediators accountable for the substantive fairness of 
the mediation agreements they help orchestrate. Rather, they require 
mediators to focus on process fairness and assume that when process 
fairness is ensured, substantive fairness will follow. To this end, the 
Standards require mediators to foster party self-determination and 
competency, mediator impartiality, and scrupulousness of process. 
But they steer clear of discussions of fairness, equity, and substantive 
justice.21 
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The code reflects the mediation culture in the United States: a 
studiously process-oriented culture that exempts mediators from the 
burden of judging the fairness of the parties' desired outcome. Still, 
while mediators need not subject proposed agreements to a fairness 
litmus test, principles of party self-determination, impartiality, and 
quality process still offer much for mediators to ponder, as this 
hypothetical illustrates. 
A mediator might view Ziba' s custody and financial giveaways 
as so problematic as to call into question the likelihood that she is 
acting voluntarily, consistent with the mandate of self-determination. 
The one-sidedness may tug at the mediator's sympathies, causing the 
mediator to ally with Ziba and creating partiality. In the face of these 
types of problems, the Model Standards instruct the mediator to "take 
appropriate steps including . . . withdrawing from or terminating 
the mediation." 
Therefore, ample justification exists for a mediator to consider 
withdrawing. But in a dispute laden with non-Westernized practices 
and behavior, the mediator should take additional steps before 
deciding whether to withdraw. The mediator needs to research the 
other culture and try to bridge any cultural gaps. These additional 
steps are .essential if the mediator wants to avoid the charge of cultural 
imperialism. 
Research the Other Culture. A mediator cannot help bridge a cultural 
gap without learning and understanding the cultural practices of 
the parties. Sources may be difficult to locate, and their messages 
recondite and conflicting. Still, the mediator needs to endeavor to 
become acquainted with the terms of a cultural practice as well as 
its rationale. The inquiry may be discomfiting because the relevant 
practice may seem abhorrent to a mediator of a certain background 
and upbringing. However, the inquiry is crucial, and the mediator 
must be open to the possibility that an offensive practice may turn 
out to be tolerable when understood in context. 
For example,22 seeking to understand a practice of arranged mar-
riages involving payment may seem offensive. After all, the practice 
was condemned in the United Nations Report of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. 23 Why seek 
to understand this approach to women and family? Because you 
might find it helpful to learn one commentator's justification for the 
practice: "The payment of mahr (dower), which involves payment or 
preferment, is a central feature of the marriage contract in Islam and, 
as a measure intended to safeguard [a woman's] economic position 
after marriage [the mahr is offered to the bride]." 
It may feel equally repugnant to remain open to a practice that gives 
men a right to a greater share of property, a practice also apparently 
condemned in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (Article 16[h]). But you might find 
it helpful to hear the same commentator's explanation on this point: 
in Islam, men have financial obligations to others that are not shared 
with women, so men need a disproportionate amount of assets to 
meet those other obligations. Of course, neither this nor the earlier 
rationale provides the final word, but they do offer leads on further 
research that a mediator might want to pursue. 
For this hypothetical case, a mediator would need to learn the cul-
tural explanation for a practice that confers on Ahmed the exclusive 
power over approving a divorce and therefore the potential to extract 
a one-sided divorce settlement. 
My preliminary research uncovered some initial insights.24 The 
Egyptian government, in commentary on an international treaty 
relating to women's rights, explained that the restrictions placed 
on women's ability to terminate marriage are designed to balance 
out their rights to full financial support within the marriage and the 
payout they receive at the marriage's end. That is, according to Shari' a, 
women enter into marriage free of any requirements to contribute 
financially but then must yield to male preferences regarding how 
long or whether the marriage is to endure. In short, Shari'a aims 
toward symmetry, balance, and equality between the sexes, although 
Westerners may not be comfortable or agree with the manner in 
which burdens and benefits are distributed. 
Bridge Any Cultural Gaps. With some understanding of the cultural 
context of the practice, the mediator is ready to proceed with 
a sophisticated self-determination inquiry. As a threshold matter, 
I assume that the parties have legal counsel. I also assume that the 
parties were encouraged to seek counsel from a trusted family member 
or friend so that each party has the benefit of a support system that 
each party trusts. 
As the mediator here, I would give Ahmed and Ziba an opportunity 
to express their reactions to the rule and consider its rationale, 
benefits, and drawbacks. Then I might follow up with clarifying and 
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reality-testing questions. This is not a simple inquiry, and of course 
it is often easier to describe what to do than to actually do it. But it 
is an essential inquiry if mediators want to seriously pursue party 
self-determination. One of two basic scenarios might emerge: Ziba 
accepts the rule or she objects to it. 
Under the first scenario, in which Ziba accepts the rule, if she 
does so understanding the disadvantageous trade-offs that it can 
produce when dissolving the marriage, at least she is making an 
informed choice to live with its consequences. Her formal acceptance 
under these circumstances, however, should not go uninspected. 
It is important to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the 
"choice" to accept. As critics of cultural pluralism point out, the term 
choice connotes options: "It is one thing to embrace a way of life when 
none other is available, an entirely different one to cling to it when 
alternatives present themselves."25 
Therefore, I would test her acceptance by tempting her with 
options. For example, Ziba does have an alternative if the mediation 
is taking place in New York State, which has a state law designed 
to diminish the ability of a husband to extort an unduly favorable 
settlement under a religious rule that gives the power to divorce to 
the husband. 26 The mediator might inquire whether the parties or 
attorneys are aware of the applicable law. Through their attorneys, 
the parties would learn that New York law authorizes a court to 
consider whether Ahmed exploited a barrier to remarriage when the 
court determines the distribution of marital property and appropriate 
maintenance. Therefore, Ziba would have an option for ameliorating 
the influence of the rule and a choice to make. She could agree to 
Ahmed's onerous demands. But she could also turn to or threaten 
to turn to the secular courts to reduce her unequal bargaining power. 
This may not seem like a real choice for someone who wants to 
preserve her standing in her own religious community. But it gives 
Ziba an opportunity to choose which value is more important to her: 
preserving her standing in her community or improving the terms of 
divorce. 
I found this part of my deliberations unsettling because it seemed 
disconcertingly easy to justify Ziba's rights waivers by casting them 
as deliberate demonstrations of her idiosyncratic will. Having know-
ingly accepted the rule and chosen to follow it, Ziba would probably 
continue to pursue the religious divorce regardless of the alternatives 
the secular courts might offer. This substantive result may be unfair 
by Westernized standards, but not necessarily unfair based on the 
values Ziba adopted. My limited role as a mediator who perseveres to 
honor the principle of party self-determination becomes clear in this 
situation. In the end, all mediators can do is conduct a process where 
the parties can make an informed choice, regardless ofhow personally 
painful the choice may be to one of the parties and how unfair the 
result may seem to the mediator. 
The second scenario is that Ziba-albeit perhaps a dedicated 
member of her religious community-objects to its rule and its 
consequences. In that case, the conflict of values between her and the 
mediator disappears. Then the mediator can no longer be accused of 
imposing his or her own values on the parties, since one of the parties 
now asserts those values. With this agreement, Ziba effectively shields 
the mediator from the charge of cultural imperialism, although not 
from the charge of partiality. The mediator no longer needs to bridge 
a cultural conflict between the mediator and the parties. The mediator 
can now return to the familiar territory of trying to bridge a gap 
between the parties. 
Withdraw? Even in the face of the parties' consent or apparent 
consent, the mediator may still find the agreement so personally 
abhorrent as to want to withdraw. But how can a mediator withdraw 
and avoid the charge of cultural imperialism? 
Walking this tightrope requires attention to two inquiries. First, 
does the cultural practice violate internationally recognized norms? 
Second, even if it doesn't, is it possible to remain impartial when 
intensely disapproving of the norms the parties are embracing? 
My search for universal international norms relating to Ziba and 
Ahmed's case led me to scrutinize international treaties touching 
on the rights of men and women in the domestic sphere. If most 
countries, including Iran and surrounding nations, had ratified these 
treaties, then I could comfortably conclude that the norm of gender 
equality was universally recognized, even by the countries to which 
Ziba and Ahmed were culturally aligned. Unfortunately, I found no 
such universal agreement. 
The United Nations General Assembly has adopted two state-
ments: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrim-
ination Against Women and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Both declare in ringing language that men and women have 
equal rights in marriage and its dissoluti~n. But when I checked the 
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fine print, I discovered that Iran has never ratified the Convention, 
and the Universal Declaration was simply enabling legislation that 
did not require endorsement or acceptance of any sort. Even worse, 
many Middle Eastern countries, including Iran's close neighbors, 
took explicit exception to the convention's gender equality language, 
opting out of those provisions that violated "norms of Islamic law" 
or were "incompatible with the provisions of the Islamic Shari' a." 
Rather than unanimity in the realm of gender equality, I found 
disarray. My forays into international law revealed no principled 
source of internationally recognized standards that could be the 
basis for withdrawing from the mediation. Different cultures view 
women's rights to enter into and exit marriage differently. Given 
this (discomfiting) fact, I pondered whether there was any other 
principled basis for withdrawing-specifically the second inquiry 
about my ability to remain both impartial and intensely disapproving 
of the norms the parties were embracing. 
Obviously if I found myself hopelessly partial-biased against 
Ahmed-then withdrawal would be appropriate. Standard II of the 
U.S. Model Standards requires mediators to maintain impartiality, 
and if my feelings about Ahmed's demands eliminate my ability to 
respond evenhandedly, then I should not continue. Standard VI's 
discussion of a "quality process" may also be implicated. Of course, 
if my decision to withdraw is based on my own cultural value, 
then I might remain vulnerable to the ultimate charge of cultural 
imperialism-the charge that I'm claiming "my culture is better than 
your culture." 
Despite my desire to be respectful toward Ziba and Ahmed's 
claimed cultural stance, withdrawal was the direction I was going 
in until my research assistant innocently asked about next steps: 
"Would what would happen after withdrawal be better than the 
mediator continuing?" she inquired. What would Ahmed and Ziba's 
BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement) be if the nego-
tiation in the mediation were prematurely halted? This inquiry 
prompted me to consider Ziba's opportunities without mediation. 
What if no fairer venue exists for her? In that case, depriving her 
of the mediation opportunity contributes to her disadvantage. If I 
withdraw, Ziba loses access to help by a third party with exper-
tise in dispute resolution, who might be culturally sensitive to this 
unequal power dynamic and might be able to help her negotiate 
further details within the parameters of the agreement. If I continue 
with the mediation, on the other hand, I might be able to help 
Ahmed and Ziba negotiate valuable details that might benefit the 
children, including addressing such issues as visitation and education 
plans. 
This was the most difficult decision moment for me. After trying to 
research Ziba's BATNA and much cogitating,27 I thought I still would 
withdraw if faced with this dilemma. I would not want the mediation 
process (or me) to be associated with such an unfair mediated result. 
I would want to avoid conferring the imprimatur of mediation on 
a process and result that violated such a core value of fairness, 
even when my definition of fairness was shaped by distinctively 
Westernized values. This was my conclusion until I realized that I 
was so determined to withdraw that I had become blinded to the 
significant benefits of continuing for the parties. I am now inclined 
to continue to mediate. 28 If both parties want to continue with me 
and the mediation, I think I should try to mediate the best agreement 
the parties are willing to enter into, so long as the agreement is not 
illegal. 
CONCLUSION. When crossing borders, mediators are crossing into 
new ethical territory. Ethical issues can arise due to differences in 
culture between the mediator and the parties. In order to navigate 
this new territory, mediators need to be aware of their own culturally 
shaped behavior and perspective and be open-minded and nonjudg-
mental when learning about other ways of behaving. And mediators 
should diligently search for ways to bridge any gaps between the 
mediator and the parties before confronting the difficult possibil-
ity of withdrawing. By conscientiously following the steps outlined 
in these comments, mediators should be able to avoid the charge 
of cultural imperialism, except when they consciously decide to be 
imperialistic. 
Editor's Thoughts on Case 12.2 
and the Comments 
Both Abramson and Menkel-Meadow acknowledge the difficulty of 
this case and come to dramatically different conclusions regarding 
what they would do. Although superficially it seems as if they "went 
to the same movie theater but saw a different show," a closer look 
reveals their analyses to be more similar than initially apparent. 
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First, both Abramson and Menkel-Meadow note that the Model 
Standards provide ample justification for withdrawal. Both make ref-
erence to the provisions regarding impartiality and ensuring a quality 
process and note that their discomfort with Ziba's anguished rights 
waivers would call into question their ability to proceed on these 
grounds. At the same time, both commentators note that the Stan-
dards beg the larger questions ofhow mediator partiality to familiar (in 
this case, Western) norms can be ethically squared with multicultural 
practice and whether the primary self-determination commandment 
takes adequate account of the coercive environments in which dis-
putants may be situated. 
Both Abramson and Menkel-Meadow note that many media-
tors would proceed on the grounds that the parties have chosen 
the governing norms and that respect for party self-determination 
justifies mediator acquiescence to that choice. However, Abramson 
questions whether choice in the absence of adequate options passes 
muster, and Menkel-Meadow affirmatively denies that Ziba's finan-
cial and custody giveaways could be viewed as "freely chosen," even 
when measured by the "thinnest" notions of self-determination's 
requirements. 
Though discomfited by Ziba's predicament, Abramson states that 
he would proceed with the case, while Menkel-Meadow maintains 
that she would have to turn it away. Each of these thoughtful mediator 
scholars reaches a fork in the road where a singular path calls. In 
assessing the road to take and the road not taken, they are prodded 
by different visions of mediator autonomy in the process. 
For Menkel-Meadow, one primary consideration appears salient. 
She believes that the opportunity for self-determination exists for 
mediators as well as parties. Mediators hew to a moral code that 
guides their everyday thoughts and actions. Just as mediation offers 
parties an opportunity to express their deepest normative commit-
ments, so too must the process respect and give voice to mediator 
values. Abramson takes a more self-abnegating view. He holds that 
mediators should strive to avoid withdrawal or termination based 
solely on their own personal assessment of the parties' values. Rather, 
withdrawal can be justified only when grounded in the parties' rejec-
tion of universally held international norms. If what the parties are 
inclined to do violates a United Nations proclamation or a treaty to 
which the majority of the world is a signatory, then withdrawal is 
amply justified. If it simply makes the individual mediator queasy, 
withdrawal is suspect. 
Given Abramson's inclination to stifle his visceral offense and 
consider Ziba and Ahmed's options, it is perhaps not surprising that 
he comes to the conclusion that he, and mediation, can produce a 
happier outcome than would likely be achieved in a different forum. 
Abramson takes a dim view of Ziba' s BATNA and so decides that the 
most ethical course is to hang in there and see if he can help bring 
about as salutary a conclusion to the marriage as is possible under 
the circumstances. Menkel-Meadow says that if she played any role 
with the couple, she would discuss with them Ziba's entitlements 
under American law and would then refer the case to someone whose 
"ethical culture" did not recoil against the structural inequities 
built into the Shari' a law that both Ziba and Ahmed honor. Menkel-
Meadow notes that ethical issues attach to the question of whether she 
is at all responsible for an outcome that another mediator facilitates 
but concludes, "That is a question for another day." 
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